A Matching Model of the Housing Market: Searching for a Motivated Partner by James Albrecht, Axel Anderson, Eric Smith and Susan Vroman











In many markets, it takes buyers and sellers time to ¯nd one another. Once contact occurs,
whether a transaction is consummated and if so at what price depends on the circumstances
of the potential traders. In the housing market, for example, the willingness of a prospective
buyer to pay a given price for a particular house depends on the buyer's income as well
as her current housing arrangements, re-location deadlines, the likelihood of ¯nding more
desirable properties, the availability of alternative rental accommodation, and so on. Sellers
have similar concerns. Such di®erences in the °ow values that buyers and sellers receive
while unmatched are an important { perhaps the most important { reason that some sales
are made while others are not. Moreover, they are likely to a®ect the terms of trade.
Circumstances not only vary across buyers and sellers, they can also change over time,
often for the worse. A buyer can initially a®ord to be selective, but eventually, if she is unable
to purchase a house on favorable terms, her search becomes more desperate. Likewise, a
typical seller entering the housing market can at ¯rst a®ord to hold out for a high price but
eventually, if he cannot ¯nd a buyer willing to pay his price, he becomes what real estate
ads often call \a motivated seller." That is, both buyers and sellers experience undesirable
transitions if they do not buy or sell quickly enough.
To assess the e®ects of such transitions on the housing market, we build a search/matching
¤We thank the anonymous referees and the editor for their suggestions. We also thank seminar participants,
especially Luca Anderlini and Rob Shimer, for their helpful comments and Lucas Navarro for excellent research
assistance.model in which both buyers and sellers experience, if they stay in the market long enough,
a decline in the °ow value of continuing to search. The emphasis on such transitions dis-
tinguishes our model from earlier search-theoretic work on the housing market.1 Moreover,
these transitions, as we argue below, not only frequently occur in this market, but their in-
corporation into our model yields implications { especially those regarding the distribution of
prices conditional on time to sale { that correspond to data commonly observed for housing
markets.
The model is straightforward. Agents enter the market in a relaxed state with a high
°ow value from being unmatched. Over time, an agent who does not buy or sell, eventually
falls into a desperate state with a °ow value that is normalized to zero. These transitions
in the °ow value of continued search, which occur at an exogenous Poisson rate, generate
heterogeneity among buyers and sellers. As time proceeds, prospective buyers and sellers
randomly meet one another and decide whether to trade. When a house is sold, the buyer
pays the seller a price { determined through Nash bargaining { which depends on the buyer
and seller types. The value of the house is independent of the two agents' types.
Not all meetings, however, necessarily lead to transactions. A match occurs, i.e., a house
moves from seller to buyer, if and only if the sale results in an increase in the sum of the
values for the two parties; otherwise, the potential buyer and seller continue to search. The
continuation °ow values that the prospective buyer and seller bring to the table determine
whether this surplus exists and therefore whether an exchange takes place. When a desperate
seller, i.e., one with a low °ow value, meets a prospective buyer, she is willing to accept a
relatively low price and so is more likely to sell. Similarly, when a desperate buyer ¯nds
a prospective seller, he is more likely to buy. Thus, the outcome of a meeting between a
prospective buyer-seller pair, i.e., whether a sale occurs and, if so, at what price, depends on
the buyer's and seller's types, which in turn are related to their durations of search.2
A rich set of implications arise. Suppose ¯rst that buyers and sellers have symmetric
°ow values when unmatched. We show in this symmetric case that only three equilibrium
matching patterns can occur. If the value of the house is su±ciently large, indiscriminate
1See, for example, Wheaton (1990), Williams (1995), or Krainer and LeRoy (2002).
2In order that not all encounters lead to transactions, some form of heterogeneity must exist. Hetero-
geneity may be match-speci¯c as in Williams (1995). Another possibility is that individuals are inherently
di®erent, i.e., there is a distribution of types across new entrants. This approach is commonly taken in the
search/matching literature, where it is usually combined with the assumption of complementarity in producing
the match output. These models then focus on heterogeneity in match values. This is the approach taken
in Becker (1973), Burdett and Coles (1997), and Shimer and Smith (2000). Our approach is to generate a
distribution of types in °ow values resulting from experience while unmatched. The output produced by the
match (the value of a house) however is not heterogeneous.
2matching (IM) in which every encounter leads to a sale obtains. For lower house values, there
is an equilibrium, which we term opportunistic matching (OM), in which relaxed searchers
wait for desperate partners, while the desperate match with anyone. If the house value is
su±ciently small, an equilibrium in which only desperate agents match (DM) arises. Finally,
for some house values, multiple equilibria (either OM or DM) are possible. In the general
(asymmetric) case, when the °ow value of relaxed buyers and the °ow value of relaxed sellers
are not the same, two additional equilibrium matching patterns are possible. In no case does
the model generate either strictly positive assortative matching (relaxed only match with
relaxed and desperate only match with desperate) or strictly negative assortative matching
(relaxed only match with desperate and vice versa).
Exploring the model's implications in more detail, we derive the marginal distribution of
price, the marginal distribution of time to sale, and the conditional distribution of price given
time to sale for the three symmetric equilibrium types (IM, OM, and DM). We analyze how
expected price and price dispersion, both unconditionally and conditional on time to sale,
vary with model parameters, both within and across equilibrium types. Similarly, we show
how expected time to sale depends on model parameters.
In constructing our model, we have made choices about which features of the housing
market to emphasize and which to abstract from. We chose to make agents heterogeneous in
terms of search values; we could have chosen heterogeneity in transaction values. We chose a
complete information framework and determined prices with Nash Bargaining; we could have
made agent types private information and made speci¯c assumptions about price negotiation.3
While we feel our model highlights an important, previously unmodeled feature of the housing
market and has a rich set of testable implications, we do not mean to suggest that the
alternative modeling choices are not appealing. In particular, private information is clearly
an important and interesting feature of the housing market. We assume complete information
in order to highlight the e®ects of transitions in °ow values without the added di±culties that
private information would entail. However, by assuming complete information, we rule out a
priori any implications for the details of price negotiations between buyers and sellers since
the Nash Bargaining solution obscures such details in its black box. As a result, we surely
miss some important features of sales price negotiations.4 (See Merlo and Ortalo-Magn¶ e 2004
3For example, Krainer and LeRoy (2002) assume that sellers make take-it-or-leave o®ers in a private
information setting. Modeling price negotiation in this way has some limitations. In particular, it implies that
the sales price depends only on the seller's type.
4Arnold (1999) explicitly models price negotiations. His model, which unlike ours is not a market model,
considers a single seller who posts an asking price that in°uences the arrival rate of potential buyers. A buyer's
valuation is realized upon arrival and becomes common knowledge. If there are potential gains from trade,
3for a detailed study of housing transactions data.)
Our assumption of a Poisson transition from relaxed to desperate is meant to capture the
various factors that alter reservation values of search, e.g., learning, borrowing constraints,
etc. while at the same time giving tractable analytic results. An alternative would be to
explicitly model the dynamics of individuals' reservation values. In the labor search literature,
this has been done by van den Berg (1990), which incorporates the limited duration of
unemployment bene¯ts, and by Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), which allows for learning
about the distribution of wage o®ers, among others. Neither of these papers incorporates this
individual decision-theoretic analysis into an equilibrium model because the resulting model
would be intractable. The assumption of a Poisson transition is a commonly used modeling
device that avoids complicated state dependence while still allowing a correlation between
time on the market and market outcomes. This assumption allows us to generate interesting
equilibrium results. For example, our results on the distribution of prices and on multiple
equilibria would simply not be possible absent the Poisson assumption.
The real test of simplifying assumptions is how useful the model is in explaining the
observed market outcomes. The foremost stylized fact from the housing market transaction
data is that, conditional on house characteristics, sales price declines with time on the market.
Merlo and Ortalo-Magn¶ e (2004, p. 214) write \Ceteris paribus, the longer the time on the
market, the lower the sale price. This is a well known empirical ¯nding ...."5 This result
arises in our IM and OM equilibria. Merlo and Ortalo-Magn¶ e (2004) also present data on
the housing sales process, i.e., o®ers made, accepted, and rejected. They ¯nd that there are
unconsummated matches; speci¯cally, they ¯nd that 1/3 of all negotiations do not lead to a
sale. This is consistent with OM and DM equilibria if one assumes that the failure to reach
a deal is the result of a lack of joint surplus resulting from the sale rather than the result
of ine±ciencies associated with private valuations. They also ¯nd that the vast majority of
sellers who fail to reach agreement in their ¯rst negotiation ultimately receive a higher price,
but a signi¯cant fraction end up accepting a lower price. This is consistent with the behavior
of a relaxed seller who chooses not to match with a relaxed buyer. The seller may get a better
price later from a more desperate buyer. If the seller changes state before selling the house,
however, and becomes a desperate seller, the house will sell at a lower price. Finally, Merlo
and Ortalo-Magn¶ e (2004) ¯nd that about 1/4 of all sellers make infrequent (typically one) but
bargaining then proceeds with the asking price as the seller's initial o®er. Like our model, Arnold (1999)
cannot capture the fact that negotiations, once started, sometimes fail to lead to agreement.
5This is consistent with earlier studies, such as Miller and Sklarz (1987), that show that as time on the
market increases, the spread between the list price and sale price increases. Horowitz (1992) shows that list
price is a good predictor of sale price.
4sizable changes in the list price during the time the house is on the market. These changes
are almost always price decreases and are usually substantial, which supports the notion of
a transition from relaxed to desperate. Similarly, Glower et al (1998) survey home sellers
and ¯nd that sellers are heterogeneous in their motivations. They argue that the empirical
evidence calls for a model in which some sellers are motivated to sell quickly, while others
are not. This also supports our modeling these transitions as changes in motivation.6
We present the details of the model in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we fully characterize
the equilibrium correspondence. That is, we establish when each of ¯ve possible equilibrium
matching con¯gurations occurs. In Section 4 we investigate the joint distribution of prices
and time to sale. Finally, in Section 5, we conclude and suggest several ways in which our
relatively simple framework could be extended to add additional realism.
2 Model
Equal numbers of buyers and sellers enter the market at an exogenous rate. They enter in
the relaxed state with a high °ow value from being unmatched. Over time, if an agent does
not buy or sell, he or she eventually moves from the relaxed into the desperate state at an
exogenous Poisson rate ¸. The °ow value for a relaxed buyer is ¯ > 0; the corresponding
value for a desperate buyer is normalized to zero. Similarly, sellers have °ow values ¾ > 0
and zero. Let Áb denote the fraction of buyers who are desperate; let Ás be the fraction of
sellers who are desperate.
Prospective traders meet each other at the exogenous constant Poisson rate ®: If the
match value of the house, x; exceeds the sum of their opportunity costs { their values of
continued search { a trade takes place at a price determined by symmetric Nash bargaining.
As the payo® to continued search depends on the buyer's and seller's states, so too does the
price. If a type b buyer and a type s seller agree to a sale, the seller receives price p(b;s);
while the buyer realizes value x ¡ p(b;s): The pair then exits the market.
The value for a relaxed buyer satis¯es
rBR = ¯ + ®Ás maxf0;x ¡ p(R;D) ¡ BRg
+®(1 ¡ Ás)maxf0;x ¡ p(R;R) ¡ BRg + ¸(BD ¡ BR):
She receives °ow value ¯ while unmatched, and meets a prospective seller at rate ®. That
6Zuehlke's (1987) ¯nding that vacant houses are more likely to sell the longer they are on the market, while
occupied houses do not exhibit duration dependence is also consistent with our relaxed/desperate dichotomy.
5seller is desperate with probability Ás; and a match is formed if and only if the joint surplus is
positive. In that case, the buyer receives value x¡p(R;D) and gives up value BR: Otherwise,
she continues unmatched. With probability 1¡Ás; the prospective seller she meets is relaxed,
a match is formed if and only if the joint surplus is positive; otherwise, she continues to search.
Finally, she moves to the desperate state at rate ¸ and receives the value BD; de¯ned by
rBD = ®Ás maxf0;x ¡ p(D;D) ¡ BDg + ®(1 ¡ Ás)maxf0;x ¡ p(D;R) ¡ BDg:
On the sellers' side, the values are
rSR = ¾ + ®Áb maxf0;p(D;R) ¡ SRg
+®(1 ¡ Áb)maxf0;p(R;R) ¡ SRg + ¸(SD ¡ SR)
rSD = ®Áb maxf0;p(D;D) ¡ SDg + ®(1 ¡ Áb)maxf0;p(R;D) ¡ SDg:
It follows from these value equations that BR > BD and SR > SD: Since the relaxed
type enjoys a positive °ow value from being unmatched, while the desperate type does not,
the relaxed type must have a strictly higher expected present discounted value.




(x ¡ Bb + Ss):
A steady-state equilibrium is a matching pattern such that (i) pairs of agents form matches
if and only if the joint surplus from doing so is positive and (ii) the appropriate steady-
state conditions are satis¯ed.7 We consider only pure-strategy equilibria. There are several
potential equilibrium types to consider. Since the prospective buyer and seller can each
be either relaxed or desperate, four possible pairings of types emerge. Since each of these
potential pairings either matches or not, there are sixteen (24) possible matching patterns.
Many of these potential matching patterns can be eliminated a priori as possible steady-
state equilibrium outcomes, leaving the ¯ve possible equilibrium con¯gurations depicted in
Figure 1. As discussed in the introduction, three of these ¯ve equilibria { IM, OM, DM { are
symmetric and are the only equilibria that can occur when buyers and sellers have symmetric
unmatched °ow values. If the unmatched °ow values are asymmetric, two other equilibria are
possible. Under buyer opportunistic matching (BOM), all buyers match only with desperate
7Existence of steady-state equilibria in models such as ours involves technical di±culties solved in Du±e
and Sun (2004).

















Figure 1: Possible Equilibrium Matching Patterns. The buyer types are in rows, while the
seller types are in columns. A ¯lled in circle indicates that matches between the relevant
types of buyers and sellers form in the given equilibrium.
sellers, while relaxed sellers do not match with anyone. BOM obtains in equilibrium for
middling values of x, when the °ow value for relaxed sellers is relatively high. Symmetrically,
seller opportunistic matching (SOM) obtains when sellers only match with desperate buyers.
Lemma 1 There are only ¯ve possible equilibrium con¯gurations. These ¯ve matching pat-
terns are depicted in Figure 1.
To establish Lemma 1, note that BR > BD and SR > SD imply that whenever a relaxed
type matches in equilibrium, his or her desperate counterpart must as well. For example, a
relaxed seller matches with a type µ buyer if SR + Bµ · x: If SR > SD; then SD + Bµ < x
must also hold; i.e., the desperate seller must also match with the type µ buyer. Second, note
that x > 0 implies at least one desperate type must match in equilibrium, else SD = BD = 0,
and desperate types could strictly improve their payo®s by matching with each other. These
insights rule out any equilibrium matching pattern not displayed in Figure 1.
We emphasize that Lemma 1 and Figure 1 rule out strict positive assortative matching
(PAM) and strict negative assortative matching (NAM). PAM obtains when only like types
match, i.e., relaxed agents only match with relaxed agents and desperate agents only match
with desperate agents. NAM obtains when agents only match with agents of the opposite
type. These two potential equilibrium types often arise in models with heterogeneity in match
values. In models such as Becker (1973) with heterogeneous match values, no frictions, and
transferable utility, when output is supermodular in types, i.e., types are complements in
production, PAM must obtain. With search frictions, PAM follows from assuming su±cient
complementarity (Shimer and Smith 2000). If utility is not transferable, then in a frictionless
matching model, PAM follows from monotonicity rather than complementarity assumptions.
That is, if each type's return to matching rises in the type of their partner, then PAM obtains.
In our model, there is no heterogeneity in match values - every match yields the same value,
x: The impossibility of PAM and NAM follows from a simple dominance argument. Since
7match values are the same and relaxed types have higher °ow values, relaxed types must
have higher unmatched values than desperate types. As a result, whenever (R,R) matches
form, (R,D) matches must form as well, blocking PAM. Similarly, whenever (R,D) matches
form, (D,D) matches must also form, blocking NAM.
For the remaining ¯ve potential equilibrium types, we need to consider the steady-state
conditions. These are simple: the °ow into the desperate state must equal the °ow out of
the desperate state (to the matched state). Let Ás and Áb be the steady-state fraction of
sellers and buyers who are desperate. The rate at which agents °ow into the desperate state
is ¸(1 ¡ Ák) for k 2 fb;sg regardless of the matching pattern. However, the rate at which
agents °ow out of the desperate state depends on the matching pattern.
In the IM and OM cases, every meeting for a desperate agent results in a match, and the
out°ow rate is ®Ák: Setting ¸(1 ¡ Ák) = ®Ák, we ¯nd




In the DM case, we still have Ás = Áb, but not equal to Á. Let ÁD be the fraction of
desperate agents in this case. The out°ow is ®(ÁD)2, since a meeting only results in a sale if







Note that ÁD > Á. Intuitively, when it is harder to exit the desperate state, there is a
larger fraction of desperate agents in steady state. We leave the asymmetric cases (SOM and
BOM) for the Appendix, to avoid cluttering the text.
3 Equilibrium Matching Patterns
In this section we characterize the equilibrium matching correspondence, i.e. we show which
matching patterns are sustainable for di®erent values of the exogenous parameters.
3.1 Symmetric Case Summary
For simplicity, normalize ¯ = ¾ = 1. Proposition 1 summarizes the symmetric case.
Proposition 1 In the symmetric case, there are three equilibrium matching patterns. The
correspondence between x and the equilibrium matching patterns is shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Symmetric Equilibrium Correspondence. We have graphed the set of equilibria for
di®ering values of x, assuming ¯ = ¾ = 1.
Figure 2 gives the possible equilibrium matching patterns for di®erent values of x. For
now, ignore the speci¯c threshold values of x, and instead focus on the general pattern. Not
surprisingly, if x is high enough, all meetings result in a match (IM) while if x is low enough,
then the converse holds: no relaxed agents match, and DM obtains.
Intermediate values of x are more interesting. For these intermediate values, OM is an
equilibrium. Although the match value x is not high enough to induce relaxed agents to
match with one another, it is high enough so that desperate agents are willing to compensate
relaxed agents to make it worth their while to match. At the lower end of the intermediate
values of x; there are multiple equilibria (OM or DM). This results from a compositional
e®ect. In DM equilibrium, the steady-state fraction of desperate agents is higher than in OM
equilibrium (ÁD > Á). The intuition for why this causes multiplicity is as follows. All agents
are better o® meeting a desperate agent rather than a relaxed one. Consider a potential
match between a desperate buyer and a relaxed seller. This match is consummated if and
only if x ¸ BD +SR: If the DM equilibrium obtains, all other (R;D) and (D;R) matches fail
to form, so there are more desperate agents in the market and BD+SR is high relative to the
case in which these matches do form. Thus, DM is a viable equilibrium pattern. If, on the
other hand, all other (R;D) and (D;R) matches form, then BD + SR becomes low relative
to the case in which these matches do not form and the now fewer desperate searchers are
more willing to trade. OM is then also a viable equilibrium pattern. Thus, the individual
willingness of desperate buyers or sellers to trade with relaxed agents generates a spillover
that reinforces their decisions and causes a coordination problem. 8
8Note that in addition to the compositional e®ect, there is another e®ect of having (R;D) and (D;R)
matches form. Holding the fraction of desperate agents constant, the fact that these matches form raises the
values of being unmatched. However, at the upper threshold, x = B
D +S
R in DM equilibrium, so there is no
net surplus to these matches and this e®ect is zero. Below the threshold (in the region of multiplicity), the
compositional e®ect then dominates.
93.2 Symmetric Case Details
For each of the three cases, we solve for the equilibrium value functions assuming existence and
then determine the parameter con¯gurations that are consistent with the given equilibrium.9
Indiscriminate Matching. For all matches to be consummated, we must have x ¡ Bb ¡
Ss ¸ 0 for all combinations of (b;s). Assuming this is the case and substituting the symmetric
Nash bargaining expressions for prices, we have the following values:
BR = SR =
4r + ®(®x + 2Á + 2¸x + 2rx + 2)
2(2r + ® + 2¸)(r + ®)
BD = SD =
®(®x + 2Á + 2¸x + 2rx ¡ 2)
2(2r + ® + 2¸)(r + ®)
:
Notice that BR = SR and BD = SD follow from assuming symmetric Nash bargaining.
We now need to determine the parameter con¯gurations that are consistent with an IM
equilibrium. Since BR (= SR) > BD (= SD); this reduces to checking when x ¡ 2BR ¸ 0:
Substituting our derived value for BR; IM is an equilibrium if and only if
x ¸
2(2r + ® + ®Á)
r(2r + 2¸ + ®)
:
This is the threshold value between IM and OM given in Figure 2.
Opportunistic Matching. We determine the conditions for an OM equilibrium in a sim-
ilar fashion. First, we assume that OM is an equilibrium and then substitute the Nash
bargaining solution for prices to give
BR = SR =
4r + ®(2rÁx + 2Á + 2¸x + 2 + ®Á2x)
2(2r2 + 2r¸ + r® + 2®Ár + 2®¸ + ®2Á2)
BD = SD =
®
¡
2xr + 2Á + 2¸x ¡ 2 + ®Á2x
¢
2(2r2 + 2r¸ + r® + 2®Ár + 2®¸ + ®2Á2)
:
Then we check what conditions ensure x · BR + SR; while at the same time, x ¸ BD + SR
(= BR + SD).
(i) For x · BR + SR; we need x ·
2(2r + ® + ®Á)
r(2r + 2¸ + ®)
; and
(ii) for x ¸ BD + SR; we need x ¸
2(r + ®Á)
r(2r + 2¸ + ®Á)
:
9In an earlier version of the paper, we showed that there is not enough opportunistic matching in equilibrium
to maximize the present discounted value of new entrants in steady state.
10Straightforward algebra establishes that the interval for x given by (i) and (ii) is nonempty.
The condition on x given in (i) is precisely the opposite of the condition required for an IM
equilibrium. These are the thresholds that we have graphed in Figure 2.
Desperate Matching. Assuming that only desperate agents match10 and substituting
symmetric Nash bargaining expressions for prices, one can solve for the following values:
BR = SR =
2(r + ®ÁD) + ®ÁDx¸
2(r + ®ÁD)(r + ¸)




Since BR = SR and BD = SD, the necessary conditions for DM equilibrium are
x ¡ 2BR · 0; x ¡ BR ¡ BD · 0; x ¡ 2BD ¸ 0:
Since BR > BD; we only need to show that x ¡ BR ¡ BD · 0 and x ¡ 2BD ¸ 0:
(iii) For x · BR + BD; we need x ·
2(r + ®ÁD)
r(2r + 2¸ + ®ÁD)
; and
(iv) since 2BD =
®ÁDx
(r + ®ÁD)
; it is obvious that x ¸ 2BD:
Condition (iii) is the same as the lower threshold in the OM case, except that we have replaced
Á with ÁD. Since ÁD > Á, the thresholds are ordered as given in Figure 2. This re°ects the
compositional e®ect noted above.
3.3 Asymmetric Case Summary
Now consider the asymmetric case with ¯ 6= ¾. We summarize the results here and work out
the algebraic details in the Appendix. Some of the features of the symmetric case extend
to the more general case. Equilibrium always exists. For some values of the parameters,
equilibrium is unique, while for others there are two equilibria. There are never more than
two equilibria. As before, IM is the only equilibrium for high x, while DM is the only
equilibrium for low x.
For intermediate values of x, the situation is more complex. Figure 3 presents the set
of possible equilibria for di®erent values of (rx;¯;¾) normalized such that rx + ¯ + ¾ = 1.
10Although they never match in DM equilibrium, relaxed agents are assumed to search. This is a strong
assumption, but it keeps the model simple. A slight perturbation of the model would give the relaxed cause to
search. For example, if buyers received a match-speci¯c value in addition to x; then, with ¯ > 0; they would
search for the \perfect" house even if almost all matches involved desperate agents. Similarly, relaxed sellers
would search for the \perfect" buyer.
11This normalization allows us to use an equilateral triangle with height 1 to represent the
equilibrium correspondence. Any triple (rx;¯;¾) is represented as a point in this triangle
such that each variable is equal to the minimum distance between the point and the side of
the triangle opposite the variable's label. For example, the base of the triangle contains all














Figure 3: Equilibrium Correspondence. We have graphed the set of equilibria for di®erent
values of (rx;¯;¾), setting ¯ + ¾ + rx = 1.
To recover the symmetric case, draw the ¯ = ¾ line in the diagram | this line is the
x-axis in the symmetric case. Note that this line does not cross through the SOM or BOM
regions of the diagram. When IM is an equilibrium, it is unique, while the DM and OM
ranges continue to overlap when ¯ and ¾ are not too far apart. The SOM and BOM regions
do not overlap with each other (or with the OM region), but each overlaps with the DM
region.
Proposition 2 In general, there are ¯ve equilibrium matching patterns. The correspondence
between x, ¯, and ¾ and the equilibrium matching patterns is shown in Figure 3.
124 The Distributions of Price and Time to Sale
Price and time to sale are the key observables in housing market data. In this section, we
investigate the joint distribution of these two variables in the symmetric case. We do this
by ¯rst deriving the marginal distributions of price and of time to sale. Then we ¯nd the
conditional distribution of price given time to sale.
4.1 The Price Distribution
The desperate matching case is trivial. There is only one price at which transactions occur,
p(D;D) = x=2. We consider the remaining cases below.
Indiscriminate Matching. We substitute the solution determined above into the Nash
bargaining conditions to ¯nd














2r + ® + 2¸
:
The fraction of transactions that take place at x=2 is Á2 + (1 ¡ Á)2: The fraction that take
place at the higher price, p(D;R); is (1 ¡ Á)Á; as is the fraction that take place at the lower
price, p(R;D): The mean (and median) price is x=2:
The comparative statics are straightforward. All prices rise with x: Increases in the other
parameters, ®; ¸; and r; all cause the high price to fall and the low price to rise. Changes in
® and ¸ also change the fractions of transactions at the various prices. Recall that Á = ¸
®+¸
so Á® < 0 and Á¸ > 0: The fraction of transactions at the extreme prices, i.e., at p(R;D)
and p(D;R); equals 2(1 ¡Á)Á: Thus, if ¸ < ®, i.e., if Á < 1
2; an increase in ® unambiguously
reduces price dispersion, while an increase in ¸ has countervailing e®ects. When ¸ > ®; the
comparative statics are reversed.








2(r + ®) ¡ r®x(1 ¡ Á)





2(r + ®) ¡ r®x(1 ¡ Á)
2(2r2 + 2r¸ + r® + 2®Ár + 2®¸ + ®2Á2)
:
The mean price is again x=2. The fraction of contacts that lead to sales is 1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2
since (R;R) matches do not form. The fraction of sales that take place at p(D;D) is thus
Á2
1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2; the fraction at p(R;D) is
(1 ¡ Á)Á
1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2; and the fraction at p(D;R) is also
(1 ¡ Á)Á
1 ¡ (1 ¡ Á)2: In this case, an increase in Á unambiguously increases the fraction of prices at
the mean; i.e., an increase in ® leads to an increase in the fraction of prices in the tails while
an increase in ¸ leads to the reverse.
The comparative statics for the prices are di®erent than in the IM case. First, an increase
in x not only increases the mean price, but it also decreases price dispersion. An increase
in r leaves the mean price unchanged but decreases the range of prices.11 As noted above,
® and ¸ a®ect the distribution of prices via their e®ect on the proportions of prices in each
category. An increase in ¸ decreases the range of prices and, as we noted above, it also
decreases dispersion by reducing the weights in the tails of the distribution. Changes in ®
have an ambiguous e®ect on the range of prices.12
Comparisons Across Equilibria. Comparing marginal price distributions across equi-
libria, holding all exogenous parameters constant, does not make sense. For example, if a
con¯guration of parameters implies that IM is the unique equilibrium, then substituting the
parameters into the formulae for the equilibrium prices in the OM case is nonsensical. Instead
we look at how the price distribution changes as we change exogenous parameters, taking
into account changes in the equilibrium matching structure. In particular, we focus on the
e®ect of varying x:
In all equilibria, the mean price (the only price in the DM equilibrium) is the same, and
the other two prices (in the IM and OM equilibria) are equidistant from the mean. The
probability that a low or high price is realized is not a function of x in any case. Thus, we
11To see this, evaluate @(p(D;D) ¡ p(R;D))=@r at the lower and upper boundary of the OM range (in x).
In both cases the result is negative. Then note that @(p(D;D) ¡ p(R;D))=@r is monotonic in x.
12It turns out that @(p(D;D) ¡ p(R;D))=@® is negative at the lower boundary of the OM range. At the
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Figure 4: Price Spread. The spread in prices as a function of x, assuming OM (vs. DM)
obtains throughout its allowable range.
can fully describe the change in the distribution of prices as a function of x by investigating
what happens to the spread in prices, p(D;R) ¡ p(D;D): For low values of x, DM obtains,
and this spread is zero. Under OM, the spread falls linearly in x. Over the IM region, the
spread is constant in x. Finally, for x at the boundary between the OM and IM regions, the
price spread is the same regardless of which equilibrium (OM or IM) occurs. See Figure 4
for a summary.
4.2 Time to Sale
In this section, we calculate the expected time to sale for each of the three symmetric equi-
libria. If G(t) equals the probability that no sale occurs by time t, then
R 1
0 G(t)dt equals the
expected time to sale. Conditional on the transition between relaxed and desperate occurring
at time ¿, we have
G(tj¿) =
e¡®¹Rt 8 t · ¿
e¡®¹R¿e¡®¹D(t¡¿) 8 t > ¿
;
where G(tj¿) is the probability that no sale occurs by time t conditional on the transition to
desperation occurring at time ¿, and ¹R and ¹D are the fractions of meetings that lead to a
sale for relaxed and desperate sellers, respectively.





®(¹R ¡ ¹D)e¡(®¹R+¸)t + ¸e¡®¹Dt
®(¹R ¡ ¹D) + ¸
:
(The density over time to sale can be found by di®erentiating the negative of G(t).) Finally,








We then substitute for ¹R and ¹D to determine the expected durations in each of the three
symmetric equilibria, as summarized in Table 1. One can show that the equilibria are or-
dered by expected time to sale from longest to shortest: desperate matching, opportunistic
matching, and indiscriminate matching.
Matching ¹R ¹D E[T]
Indiscriminate 1 1 1=®
Opportunistic Á 1 [(® + ¸)2]=[®¸(2® + ¸)]
Desperate 0 Ád 1=¸ + 2=[
p
¸(4® + ¸) ¡ ¸]
Table 1: Expected Time to Sale. This table gives the expected time to sale in each of the
three cases.
4.3 The Distribution of Price Given Time to Sale
We are interested in the distribution of price conditional on time to sale since this is what one
typically observes in data. In DM equilibrium, the price is p(D;D) = x=2 with probability
one. The IM and OM cases are more interesting, and we consider them in turn.
Indiscriminate Matching. Consider a transaction by a vintage t seller, i.e., a seller whose
completed duration is t. In order to compute the conditional distribution of price given t,
we need to know the probability that the seller was desperate conditional on t: Pr(s = Djt).
With indiscriminate matching, each type of seller is equally likely to transact, thus Pr(s =
Djt) = Á(t), where Á(t) is the proportion of vintage t sellers who are desperate. The chance
of remaining on the market to time t and remaining relaxed is thus e¡(®+¸)t, while the chance
of remaining on the market and being desperate is (1 ¡ e¡¸t)e¡®t, so
Á(t) = 1 ¡ e¡¸t:
16Recall that the proportion (across all vintages) of desperate buyers in the market is Á =
¸=(® + ¸), so the conditional distribution of price given t is
f(p(R;D)jt) = (1 ¡ Á)Á(t) =
®(1 ¡ e¡¸t)
® + ¸
f(p(D;D)jt) = ÁÁ(t) =
¸(1 ¡ e¡¸t)
® + ¸
f(p(R;R)jt) = (1 ¡ Á)(1 ¡ Á(t)) =
®e¡¸t
® + ¸




Since p(D;D) = p(R;R) = x=2; the fraction of transactions occurring at price x=2 equals
f(p(D;D)jt) + f(p(R;R)jt) =
¸ + (® ¡ ¸)e¡¸t
® + ¸
:
Opportunistic Matching. This case is more complicated since relaxed sellers and des-
perate sellers transact at di®erent rates, which complicates the calculation of the probability
that the seller was desperate conditional on transacting at vintage t. Bayes rule yields
Pr(s = Djt) =
Pr(tjs = D)Pr(s = D)
Pr(tjs = D)Pr(s = D) + Pr(tjs = R)Pr(s = R)
=
®Á(t)
®Á(t) + ®Á(1 ¡ Á(t))
=
Á(t)
Á(t) + Á(1 ¡ Á(t))
.
To determine Á(t) note that the chance of surviving to time t and remaining relaxed is
e¡(¸+®Á)t. The chance of surviving to time t and being desperate is more complicated. For






®(1 ¡ Á) ¡ ¸
Then, Á(t) equals the chance of surviving to time t and being desperate, divided by the








So, altogether we have:
f(p(R;D)jt) = (1 ¡ Á)Pr(s = Djt) =
(1¡Á)Á(t)
Á(t)+Á(1¡Á(t))
f(p(D;D)jt) = ÁPr(s = Djt) =
ÁÁ(t)
Á(t)+Á(1¡Á(t))
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Figure 5: Mean and variance of the sales price conditional on time to sale for the case:
(®;¸;r) = (2;1;0:1) and x at the threshold between the IM and OM cases (approximately
13.65). The scale for each case di®ers, in both cases the mean is measured along the left hand
axis, while the variance is measured along the right hand axis.
Finally, we use these formulae to determine conditional means and variances. The exact
expressions are complicated, and so we restrict their display to the Appendix. We summarize
their characteristics in the following proposition. See Figure 5 for a parametric example.
Proposition 3 In the IM and OM cases, the expected price falls with time to sale. In both
cases the variance of price initially increases and then later falls with time to sale, speci¯cally:
IM For all t <
log2
¸
the variance is increasing in t, and decreasing thereafter.
OM The variance increases near t = 0, and there is a cuto® ¿ such that the variance
decreases for all t > ¿.
The result for expected price is clearly intuitive. The longer is the time to sale, the less
likely the seller is to be relaxed. The reason that V ar(p) ¯rst increases and then decreases is
that for low values of t; almost all sellers are relaxed, for high values of t; almost all sellers are
desperate, and for intermediate values of t; seller types are mixed. Given that the distribution
of buyer types is stationary, this mixing is what leads to the greater variance in sales price.
5 Remarks and Conclusions
In this paper, we present a simple matching model of the housing market. We assume agents
are heterogeneous with respect to the °ow values they retain if they remain unmatched but
18homogeneous in their match values in the sense that the value of a consummated transaction
does not depend on the agents' types. We also assume that buyers and seller experience
°ow value transitions. This captures the idea that while buyers and sellers are relaxed upon
entering the housing market, they eventually become desperate (\motivated") if they do not
match in the meantime.
Our model has a number of implications. First, in contrast to the outcomes that one
often sees in models with match value heterogeneity, strict positive assortative and negative
assortative matching cannot occur in steady-state equilibrium. In the symmetric case, there
are three matching patterns that can occur: (i) indiscriminate matching (IM) { all potential
sales are consummated; (ii) opportunistic matching (OM) { desperate agents will buy from
or sell to anyone, but relaxed agents wait to ¯nd desperate partners; and (iii) desperate
matching (DM) { the only transactions that occur are those between desperate buyers and
sellers. Fixing the other parameters of the model, we show that IM necessarily obtains if x;
the value of a house, is su±ciently high. For lower values of x; OM is the unique equilibrium
outcome; for still lower values, either OM or DM can obtain; for the lowest values of x;
DM is the unique equilibrium outcome. We also completely characterize the equilibrium
correspondence for the general (asymmetric) case.
We explore the implications of our model in the symmetric case in more detail. Speci¯-
cally, we derive the marginal distribution of price, the marginal distribution of time to sale,
and the conditional distribution of price given time to sale for the three equilibrium types (IM,
OM, and DM). We analyze how expected price and price dispersion, both unconditionally and
conditional on time to sale, vary with model parameters, both within and across equilibrium
types. Similarly, we show how expected time to sale depends on model parameters.
Our objective in this paper has been to construct a simple foundation that can serve
as a basis for more elaborate models of the housing market. As such, we have omitted
many realistic details. In many cases, we believe these can be added relatively easily. One
potential elaboration is to assume that x is an idiosyncratic draw from some distribution F
as in Williams (1995) and Arnold (1999). The assumption of a match-speci¯c draw might
be a force in favor of NAM. A relaxed buyer can a®ord to wait for a particularly favorable
draw from F On the other hand, a relaxed seller can a®ord to wait for a buyer who really
loves his house. The assumption of a match-speci¯c draw puts relaxed sellers in a better
bargaining position, which in turn increases the incentive for a relaxed seller to wait for
a desperate, and hence exploitable, partner. The other virtue of this assumption about x
is its empirical potential. We do not observe one- or three-point price distributions, even
19for virtually identical houses. Adding a match-speci¯c component would smooth the price
distribution.
A second potential elaboration is to allow more heterogeneity across agents. For example,
one might assume that there is a distribution of ¸ across new entrants to the market so
that some agents expect to become desperate more quickly than others do. This opens up
the possibility of a positive correlation between price and time to sale. The reason is that
sellers with low values of ¸ can a®ord to wait for prospective buyers who either are already
desperate or who are at high risk of becoming so. This is a force that biases the composition
of prospective sellers whose houses have been on the market a long time towards those who
have good bargaining positions. Of course, at the same time, heterogeneity in ¸ among buyers
biases the composition of the pool on that side of the market towards those with low values
of ¸ since those are the buyers who can a®ord to hold out for a good deal.
There are myriad other possible elaborations. Most of the ones that we think have sub-
stantial empirical potential can be incorporated into our framework without great analytical
di±culty. This is the sense in which we argue that we have constructed a useful foundation
for search-matching models of the housing market.
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22Appendix
A Asymmetric Case Details
In this section we present the details behind Proposition 2 and the corresponding Figure 3.
We do not explicitly solve for equilibrium prices (not required for the proposition), but could
certainly do so using the value functions we derive. Recall that Figure 3 is drawn for the case
of ¯ + ¾ + rx = 1:
Indiscriminate Matching. The value functions in this case are
rBR = ¯ + ®Ás[x ¡ p(R;D) ¡ BR] + ®(1 ¡ Ás)[x ¡ p(R;R) ¡ BR] + ¸(BD ¡ BR):
rBD = ®Ás[x ¡ p(D;D) ¡ BD] + ®(1 ¡ Ás)[x ¡ p(D;R) ¡ BD]
rSR = ¾ + ®Áb[p(D;R) ¡ SR] + ®(1 ¡ Áb)[p(R;R) ¡ SR] + ¸(SD ¡ SR)
rSD = ®Áb[p(D;D) ¡ SD] + ®(1 ¡ Áb)[p(R;D) ¡ SD]
When there is indiscriminate matching on both sides of the market, Ás = Áb = Á: Taking this
into account, substituting the Nash prices into the value functions, and solving simultaneously
yields expressions for BR; SR; BD; and SD:
For this equilibrium to make sense, we need x¡Bb¡Ss ¸ 0 for all b;s. Since relaxed types
enjoy a higher payo® in equilibrium than desperate types, we simply need: x¡BR ¡SR ¸ 0.
Substituting the expressions for BR and SR and simplifying, we ¯nd:
rx ¸
(¯ + ¾)(2r + ®(1 + Á))
(2r + 2¸ + ®)
Thus, in our diagram (in which we have ¯xed ®, ¸, and r) the IM region is de¯ned by a line
parallel to the ¯¾ side of the triangle. Solving for the ¾ = 0 intercept of this line (setting
¯ = 1 ¡ rx) yields:
rx =
2r + ®(1 + Á)
4r + 2¸ + ®(2 + Á)
Opportunistic Matching. The value functions in this case are
rBR = ¯ + ®Ás[x ¡ p(R;D) ¡ BR] + ¸(BD ¡ BR):
rBD = ®Ás[x ¡ p(D;D) ¡ BD] + ®(1 ¡ Ás)[x ¡ p(D;R) ¡ BD]
23rSR = ¾ + ®Áb[p(D;R) ¡ SR] + ¸(SD ¡ SR)
rSD = ®Áb[p(D;D) ¡ SD] + ®(1 ¡ Áb)[p(R;D) ¡ SD]
When there is opportunistic matching, Ás = Áb = Á: Using this, substituting for prices, and
solving simultaneously yields for BR; SR; BD; and SD:
For this equilibrium to make sense, we need x ¡ BR ¡ SR · 0 and x ¡ Bb ¡ Ss ¸ 0 for
all other b;s. Again relaxed agents have a higher value than their desperate counterparts,
so we need not be concerned with the condition x ¡ BD ¡ SD ¸ 0. We now substitute the
value functions into each of these expressions in turn and simplify to determine the allowable
ranges for x to support OM.
i) x ¡ BR ¡ SR · 0:
rx ·
(¯ + ¾)(2r + ® + ®Á)
(2r + ® + 2¸)
:
Note that this is precisely the opposite of the condition required for IM to be an equilibrium.
ii) x ¡ BR ¡ SD ¸ 0:
rx ¸
(2r + ® + ®Á)¯
(2r + ® + 2¸)
¡
®2Á(® + 2¸)¾
(2r + ® + 2¸)[2r(® + ¸) + ¸(3® + 2¸)]
: (A1)
This de¯nes a line running from the interior of the rx¯ segment to the interior of the ¾¯
segment in Figure 3. Note that the ¾ = 0 intercept of this line is the same as the line de¯ning
the IM region, as drawn in Figure 3.
iii) x ¡ BD ¡ SR ¸ 0:
This condition is the same as that immediately preceding with the roles of ¯ and ¾
reversed. Thus, the ¯ = 0 intercept is the same as that for the line de¯ning the IM region.
Desperate Matching. The value functions in this case are easily determined to be














2(r + ®ÁD)(r + ¸)
:
For desperate matching to be an equilibrium we need x¡BD¡SD ¸ 0, while the inequality
24must be °ipped for all other possible matched pairs. For now assume:
rx ·
2¯(r + ®ÁD)
®ÁD and rx ·
2¾(r + ®ÁD)
®ÁD : (A2)
so that, BR ¸ BD and SR ¸ BD (we shall verify that these conditions are not binding).
Then we need only check that BR + SD ¸ x and BD + SR ¸ x.
i) BR + SD ¸ x. Substituting the value functions into the condition gives:
rx ·
2¯(r + ®ÁD)
(2r + 2¸ + ®ÁD)
(A3)
Note that this is more restrictive than the ¯rst inequality in (A2), since the denominator is
strictly larger. When it holds with equality (A3) de¯nes a line which starts in the ¾ = 1
corner and intersects the rx¯ line segment. We know from the ¾ = ¯ case that this line
intersects the ¾ = ¯ line at a higher value of rx than the lines de¯ning the upper boundary
(RHS boundary) of the OM region. It turns out the ¾ = 0 intercept is at a lower rx value.
To see this, one can easily solve for the intercept:
rx =
2(r + ®ÁD)
4r + 2¸ + 3®ÁD
which is less than the ¾ = 0 intercept of the line de¯ning the IM region, since
2(r + ®ÁD)
4r + 2¸ + 3®ÁD <
2r + ®(1 + Á)
4r + 2¸ + ®(2 + Á)
2(r + ®ÁD)
2r + 2¸ + ®ÁD + 2r + 2®ÁD <
2r + ®(1 + Á)
2r + 2¸ + ® + 2r + ®(2 + Á)
2r + 2¸ + ®ÁD + 2r + 2®ÁD
2(r + ®ÁD)
>
2r + 2¸ + ® + 2r + ®(2 + Á)
2r + ®(1 + Á)
2r + 2¸ + ®ÁD
2(r + ®ÁD)
+ 1 >
2r + 2¸ + ®
2r + ®(1 + Á)
+ 1
2(r + ®ÁD)
2r + 2¸ + ®ÁD <
2r + ®(1 + Á)
2r + 2¸ + ®
which we established in the symmetric case (see Fig. 2).
ii) BD + SR ¸ x: Substituting in value functions we ¯nd:
rx ·
2¾(r + ®ÁD)
(2r + 2¸ + ®ÁD)
25Note that this is more restrictive then the second inequality in (A2), since the denominator
is strictly larger. When this condition holds with equality it de¯nes the lower of the two lines
starting in the ¯ = 1 corner, as shown in Figure 3.
Buyer Opportunistic Matching. When BOM obtains, relaxed sellers do not match,
while desperate sellers match with anyone. Thus, relaxed buyers `opportunistically' match
with desperate sellers (see Figure 1 for a reminder). The seller opportunistic matching case
is the same with the roles of buyers and sellers reversed, so we need only solve the BOM case
here.
We did not solve for the steady state conditions in the text for this case, so we do so now.
For sellers, the °ow into the desperate state is ¸(1 ¡ Ás), while the °ow out of the desperate
state is ®Ás. For buyers, the °ow into the desperate state is ¸(1 ¡ Áb), while the °ow out
is ®ÁbÁs (since desperate buyers will only match with desperate sellers). Thus, the steady
state satis¯es
¸(1 ¡ Ás) = ®Ás








For BOM to be an equilibrium we require
BR + SR ¸ x; BD + SR ¸ x; BR + SD · x; BD + SD · x:
Only the second and third constraint can be binding (again, relaxed agents have a higher
value than desperate agents). In the interest of brevity, we suppress the speci¯c formula for
the value functions in this case, and instead go directly to the implied restrictions on x.
i) BD + SR ¸ x: Substitution yields:
rx ·
(2r + ® + ®Á)¾
(2r + ® + 2¸)
¡
®2¸(® + 2¸)¯
(® + ¸)(2r + ® + 2¸)[2r(® + ¸) + ¸(3® + 2¸)]
Note that this is the opposite of inequality (A1), and thus the upper boundary for the BOM
region is coincident with the boundary for the OM region.
26ii) BR + SD · x:
rx ¸
¯(2r + ®(Áb + Ás))
(2r + 2¸ + ®Ás)
When this condition holds with equality it de¯nes the higher of the two lines that starts from
the ¾ = 1 corner in Figure 3. Since BOM = OM when ¯ = ¾ this line must meet the peak
of the OM region on the ¯ = ¾ line. Note that this means the BOM region must overlap the
DM region.
Seller Opportunistic Matching. This case is identical to the Buyer Opportunistic Match-
ing case, with the roles of ¯ and ¾ reversed.
B Proof of Proposition 3
Using the formula displayed in the text, determining the following means and variances is a
straightforward (if tedious) task:




(® + ¸)e¡¸t ¡ ®
(® + ¸)(2r + ® + 2¸)
V arIM(p j t) =
®¸ + (® + ¸)2(1 ¡ e¡¸t)e¡¸t
(® + ¸)2(2r + ® + 2¸)














®+¸ ¡ ®(2® + ¸)e®t
¸
V arOM(p j t) =
h1(®;¸;r)2(® + ¸)(e
(¸2+2®¸)t







®+¸ ¡ ®(2® + ¸)e®t
¸2
where:
h1(®;¸;r) = (® + r)(®2xr ¡ 2¸r ¡ 2®(r + ® + ¸) < 0
h2(®;¸;r) = 2r2(® + ¸)2 + ®¸(2®2 + 5®¸ + 2¸2) + r(®3 + 6®2¸ + 7®¸2 + 2¸3) > 0
h3(®;¸;r) = ¸3 + 4®¸2 + 2®2¸ ¡ 4®3:
It is not immediately obvious why h1 must be negative. To see that it must be, ¯rst note
that h1 < 0 if and only if x > 2(® + ¸)(® + r)=r®2. If we can show that this threshold is
greater then the upper bound of the OM range then we are done, for OM cannot obtain for
27such high x. Thus, if we need to show that:
(® + ¸)(® + r)
®2 >
(2r + ® + ®Á)
(2r + 2¸ + ®)
:
If we cross multiply, then we have:




which if expanded is clearly positive.
One can verify that @EIM(p j t)=@t < 0 by inspection. The partial derivative of V arIM(p j
t) is of the same sign as:
@(1 ¡ e¡¸t)e¡¸t
@t
= ¸e¡2¸t(2 ¡ e¸t)
so that the threshold ¿ solves: e¸¿ = 2, i.e. log2=¸.











®+¸ ¡ ®(2® + ¸)e®t
¸2 < 0
In order to establish the result for the variance in the OM case, we calculate:









(® + ¸)(4®2 + 3®¸ + ¸2)e
¸(2®+¸)t




®+¸ ¡ ®(2® + ¸)e®t
¸3
First note that this derivative is continuous, and evaluating this derivative at t = 0 yields:





so the derivative is positive near t = 0. Now note that as t ! 1 the numerator and
denominator of ª(t) are dominated by the same term (either e
(¸+ ®¸
®+¸)t or e®t), thus for t
high enough the numerator and denominator are of the same sign, so the whole expression
is negative (actually, it tends to 0, but from below). ¤
28